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Abstract
When interacting with computer agents, people make
inferences about various characteristics of these agents,
such as their reliability and trustworthiness. These per-
ceptions are signiﬁcant, as they inﬂuence people’s be-
havior towards the agents, and may foster or inhibit re-
peated interactions between them. In this paper we in-
vestigate whether computer agents can use the expres-
sion of emotion to inﬂuence human perceptions of trust-
worthiness. In particular, we study human-computer in-
teractions within the context of a negotiation game, in
which players make alternating offers to decide on how
to divide a set of resources. A series of negotiation
games between a human and several agents is then fol-
lowed by a “trust game.” In this game people have to
choose one among several agents to interact with, as
well as how much of their resources they will trust to
it. Our results indicate that, among those agents that
displayed emotion, those whose expression was in ac-
cord with their actions (strategy) during the negotiation
game were generally preferred as partners in the trust
game over those whose emotion expressions and ac-
tions did not mesh. Moreover, we observed that when
emotion does not carry useful new information, it fails
to strongly inﬂuence human decision-making behavior
in a negotiation setting.
Introduction
It has been well-documented that humans treat computers
as social agents, in that they perceive in them human traits,
expect socially intelligent responses, and act toward them
in a socially appropriate manner (Nass and Moon 2000;
Nass 2004). This leaves open the possibility that an agent
may inﬂuence how humans perceive it through its presence
and behavior. The agent might ﬁnd it advantageous to do
so if such perceptions stand to inﬂuence the interaction out-
come, or perhaps the likelihood that similar interactions will
take place in the future. In this paper we focus on human
perceptions of trustworthiness, and study the extend that
these may be inﬂuenced by agent expressions of emotion in
a computer-human negotiation environment.
Negotiation is a commonly-used method for parties with
diverging interests to reach a mutually-beneﬁcial agreement.
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People negotiate over how to schedule activities when par-
ticipants have different time constraints and priorities, to
efﬁciently allocate valuable resources across individuals or
corporations with varying needs and preferences, or to re-
solve international conﬂicts without resorting to violence.
The signiﬁcance of negotiation has led to a large literature
in the ﬁelds of psychology, economics, sociology and com-
puter science (e.g., see (Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders 2010),
(Raiffa 1985) and (Jennings et al. 2001)). Computer agents
have been used in many negotiation settings, sometimes act-
ing on behalf of humans (Jennings et al. 2001) and some-
times negotiating with them (Lin and Kraus 2010). As the
scale and complexity of the domains in which negotiation
is employed are expected to increase, we foresee a growth
in the use of computer agents as negotiators; examples of
such domains might include trafﬁc management (Kamar and
Horvitz 2009) and commerce (Maes, Guttman, and Moukas
1999), among others. Furthermore, computer agents have
shown potential (compared with human negotiations) for
improving negotiation outcomes in some cases (Lin, Oshrat,
and Kraus 2009).
Yet negotiation studies with computer agents have largely
overlooked the fact that humans use signiﬁcant verbal and
non-verbal cues when they negotiate (Drolet and Mor-
ris 2000). The expression of emotion, in particular, has
been shown to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence negotiation outcomes
(Barry, Fulmer, and Goates 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu,
and Manstead 2010). For instance, displaying anger was
shown to be effective in forcing larger concessions out of
the other party, whereas positive emotion was found to be
helpful in exploring and achieving mutually beneﬁcial (inte-
grative) solutions (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead 2004;
Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). The effects of emotion during
business negotiations were also shown to be modulated by
culture (Leung et al. 2005). In most studies in which emo-
tion was expressed by computer agents, this emotion was
conveyed by means of text sent by the computer agent to its
human partner (e.g., in (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead
2004) the computer would say “this offer makes me re-
ally angry”). More recent implementations of virtual agents
tested for differences among different modalities of emotion
expression(e.g.,textorvirtualface)andfoundnosigniﬁcant
differences (de Melo, Carnevale, and Gratch 2010).
We make two contributions in this paper. First, we inves-tigate the effects of emotion on people’s perceptions of an
agent’s trustworthiness. Such perceptions are formed in the
course of human-computer interactions (in our case, nego-
tiations; see (Bos et al. 2002)). We obtain robust results in-
dicating that the expression of emotion does inﬂuence per-
ceptions of trustworthiness. In particular, an agent is being
perceived as more trustworthy when its expressed emotion
is in accord with its actions during the interaction.
Second, we look at the effect of expressed emotion on
negotiation outcomes. Our results reveal only small inﬂu-
ences on most negotiation metrics, in contrast with many
well-documented ﬁndings (e.g., anger resulting in higher
concessions by the human). We hypothesize that this is a
consequence of the fact that the negotiation strategies of
our agents were too “scripted” and predictable. As a result,
the expressed emotion did not convey new information that
could be used by humans in their decision-making. With-
out the emotion carrying an important informational signal,
people seem to ignore it.
These observations show that the expression of emo-
tion holds potential beneﬁts in human-computer decision-
making, and should be viewed as a key part of agent design.
However, deploying emotion successfully is not a simple
matter, because the appropriate expression is very much de-
pendent on context. Moreover, our results suggest that emo-
tion can inﬂuence human decision-making behavior only
when it has the ability to convey new information beyond
the observed decisions of the agent.
Experiment Design
To investigate the effect of emotion in human-computer ne-
gotiation and perceptions of trustworthiness we developed
the following game: A human subject (h) is paired with a
computer agent (a), and they must negotiate on how to di-
vide a set of resources amongst themselves. The resources
consist of virtual “coins” of four types: gold, silver, bronze
and iron. In each game, there are three (3) coins of each type.
Before the game starts, people are told the relative value of
each coin type, i.e., that gold coins are more valuable than
silver, which are more valuable than bronze, which are more
valuable than iron coins. However, people are not given the
exact numeric value (in points) of each coin type.1 Subjects
are also informed that the relative valuation of the items by
the agents might be different than their own, e.g., computers
might prefer silver coins over gold ones. Notationally, we re-
fer to the four item types with numbers j 2 f1;2;3;4g. We
also use wi
j to denote the number of points player i 2 fh;ag
receives by possessing a coin of type j. In all experiments
wh =< 10;7;5;2 > and wa =< 10;2;5;7 >. Notice how
item types 1 and 3 (gold and bronze) present a “distributive
problem,” i.e., players need to decide how to split items of
common value, but items 2 and 4 (silver and iron) present
“integrative potential,” i.e., there are exchanges of items that
lead to mutual beneﬁt. Moreover, it must be pointed out that
computer agents have full knowledge of vectors wh and wa.
1A preliminary experiment with N = 25 showed that people’s
behavior is not affected by them knowing the point value of every
coin type.
The game proceeds by means of alternating offers, and
participants play in turns, with the human always making
the ﬁrst offer in a game. An offer by player i 2 fh;ag
consists of a complete allocation of all coins between the
two participants. We use the notation ci
j(t) to denote how
many items of type j 2 f1;2;3;4g player i was given in
the offer made at round t 2 f1;2;:::g. Hence, allowing
only for complete allocations means that in every round t,
offers must satisfy ch
j(t) + ca
j(t) = 3;8j. In every round
t > 1 the negotiator whose turn it is may accept an offer, in
which case the game ends and both participants make their
corresponding points; for the human player, these would be
h =
P
j wh
j ch
j(t   1). Alternatively, she may reject the of-
fer, and counter-offer a different split of the items. Finally,
at any point in the game, either participant may drop out. A
game consists of a maximum of 15 rounds.2 If no agreement
is reached in any of these rounds, or if either player drops
out, both players make zero points.
The agents in our experiment differed in two ways: with
respecttotheirstrategy,andwith respect totheiremotionex-
pression. The strategy of an agent encompasses when offers
are accepted or rejected, and what counter-offers are made
by it. Likewise, the emotion expression of an agent deﬁnes
whether emotion is expressed, and what type of emotion is
displayed in each circumstance. Below we discuss the strate-
gies and emotion expression policies we used in our agents;
we also explain how emotion was displayed to the human.
Strategies of computer agents
The strategy of an agent prescribes how the agent behaves
as a negotiator. Although the literature on effective negotia-
tion strategies is extensive (Sycara and Dai 2010), we lim-
ited ourselves to simple, intuitive strategies for this exper-
iment. Our goal was not to exhaustively explore the effect
of emotion expression given complex strategies, but to as-
sess whether emotion has any effect on people’s behavior in
computer-human negotiation, and whether this effect is de-
pendent upon the agent’s strategy.
The strategies we used varied along two dimensions:
“ﬂexibility” and “self-interestedness.” An agent follows a
ﬂexible strategy if its offers change from round to round
throughout the game; its strategy is inﬂexible if it always
makes the same offer (or very similar ones) in every round.
In a similar fashion, an agent is said to follow a self-
interested strategy if it attempts to keep for itself almost all
the pointsbeing negotiated;its strategyisnon-self-interested
if the agent seeks agreement on balanced offers, which pro-
vide a more or less equal split of the points. We used four
simple strategies, described below. (Table 1 groups them ac-
cording to ﬂexibility and self-interestedness.)
1. Selﬁsh: The selﬁsh agent in every round chooses a single
coin at random (but never a gold one) to counter-offer
to the human, and keeps everything else for itself. Thus
selﬁsh agents are inﬂexible and self-interested.
2Noticehow,ifthehumanalwaysmakestheﬁrstoffer,theagent
always makes the last offer. If the game reaches the 15th round,
then the human can either accept the computer’s offer, or drop out,
since there are no more rounds for counter-offers to be made.2. Nash: This agent computes the Nash bargaining point
(N.B.P.) of the game, which is the allocation that max-
imizes the product of both players’ payoffs, and offers
that in every round. The N.B.P. presents the theoretically
most efﬁcient point in the negotiation, as it is Pareto-
optimal and satisﬁes a series of axiomatic constraints
(Nash 1950). N.B.P. allocations split the points in a very
balanced fashion, thus this agent is inﬂexible but non-
self-interested.
3. Conceder: This agent performs concessions in a constant
rate. In particular, no matter how the human behaves, at
round t the agent offers her 3t
2 points and keeps every-
thing else for itself. In other words, the ﬁrst time it plays
it will offer the human 3 points (round 2), the second time
6 points, etc. Since this agent starts from very imbalanced
offers (only 3 or 6 of a total of 72 points) and concedes
slowly, it is categorized as self-interested but ﬂexible.
4. Tit-For-Tat: This is an agent implementing reciprocity. In
round t it offers the human 0:8 
P
j wa
j(t   1) points.
Hence, the more concessionary the human has been in
her last offer, the more concessionary the agent becomes;
likewise, if the human has been selﬁsh, the agent would
reciprocate this. The 0.8 coefﬁcient represents a degree
of “toughness” by the agent, i.e., it reciprocates slightly
less than what it is being offered. This agent is both ﬂex-
ible and non-self-interested, as agreement will only be
reached when the two players start conceding, eventually
“meeting” somewhere in the middle.
Inﬂexible Flexible
Non-self-interested Nash Tit-For-Tat
Self-interested Selﬁsh Conceder
Table1:Strategiesusedinthenegotiationgame,groupedaccording
to their ﬂexibility and self-interestedness.
All agent types accept an offer made by the human if and
only if the points they would request in their counter-offer
(according to their strategy) are no greater than the points
the human is currently giving them. Agents never drop out
of the game. Also, whenever agents wish to give a certain
number of points to the human, they choose the most inte-
grative way of doing so (i.e., of all possible counter-offers
that would give the human c points, they choose the offer
that maximizes their own points).
Emotion expression by agents
The emotion expression policy of an agent denotes whether
and how it displays affect. Affect in our game was displayed
on a “face” the agent was given. Faces were all male, and
were randomly assigned to the various agents from a pool
of 15 templates, such that no subject would interact with
two agents bearing the same face during the experiment.
The face of the agent was rendered to the side of the game
board, on which the items were being negotiated. We used
ﬁve emotion expression policies, described below:
1. No-Face: This is the baseline case, in which there is no
visible face to the agent.
Figure 1: The Negotiation Game
2. Poker-Face: This agent shows a face, but never displays
any emotion on it, always keeping a neutral expression.
We differentiate between this agent and the No-Face to
assess how much of any effect comes from displaying
emotions, or merely from the presence of a face (even if
it displays no emotions).
3. Always-Smile: This agent displays a face and smiles to
all the offers made by the human, independently of what
these offers look like.
4. Always-Angry: This agent displays a face and expresses
anger toward all the offers made by the human, again,
independently of what these offers look like.
5. Appraisal: This agent would smile or show anger de-
pending on the human’s actions, instead of following a
ﬁxed strategy. If at round t it was offered by the human
at least 3
2t points it would smile, otherwise it would show
anger.
All agents that display emotion follow the same pattern of
expression: First, they “look” to their right, where the coins
are, to “see” the offer made by the human; they then “look
back” toward the human (straight gaze), perform their ex-
pression (of joy or anger), and send their counter-offer (or
acceptance notiﬁcation). Joy is expressed by a smile across
theface,whichformsinmoderatespeed(1sec).Angerisex-
pressed by contraction of the corrugator muscle (frowning)
as well as an aggressive twitching of the mouth. Expressions
dissipate linearly towards normal (expressionless face) after
the counter-offer is sent, while the human is deciding her
move. These particular displays were shown to be successful
in conveying the desired emotions in (de Melo, Carnevale,
and Gratch 2010). Also, no “gradients” of the expressions
were employed (e.g., more or less intense smiles)—all ex-
pressions were of the same intensity. A screenshot of the
negotiation game can be seen in Figure 1.
It must be pointed out that several factors in the presen-
tation of emotion have been overlooked in order to keep the
experiment simple, although they could presumably be car-
rying strong effects which are well-documented in the liter-
ature. In particular, we did not test for gender effects, as all
our agents were male. We also did not test for the effect ofFigure 2: The Trust Game
race, age, or physical attractiveness, which could all mediate
how expressed emotions are interpreted. In all these cases,
we tried to keep these variables constant (using agents of
the same age and gender) whenever possible, or randomize
uniformly (for race).
The trust game
Each subject in the experiment plays several negotiation
games with different agents. After every three such games,
in which the agents differ in their emotion expression policy,
but not in their strategy, subjects are asked to play a ‘trust
game.’ As an example, someone might play with three Tit-
For-Tat agents, the ﬁrst of whom always smiles, the second
always shows anger, and the third maintains an expression-
less face. After these three games, the subject is asked to
play a trust game with one of them. The trust game is a
variant of the popular public goods game. To play it, peo-
ple ﬁrst have to select which of these three agents they want
to be paired with. (Agents are given names at random, like
“Michael” or “James” to assist recall.) After they indicate
their choice, they are presented with a trust problem. In par-
ticular, they are shown their total gains (in coins) from the
previous three negotiation games, and are asked what frac-
tion of these they are willing to trust to the agent they have
chosen as their partner. If the agent’s policy includes show-
ing a face, it also is displayed, but no emotions are ever
shown on it.
If the subject chooses to trust her partner with a non-
empty subset of her gains t =< t1;t2;t3;t4 >, where tj
is the count of coins of type j she has trusted, this subset is
tripled at the hands of the agent. Then, however, the agent
chooses what percentage p 2 [0;1] of the value of these
coins it will return to the human, and how much it will keep
for itself. Agents all choose p uniformly at random from
[1
3; 2
3], but subjects are told nothing about this. The subject at
the end of the trust game keeps the points she has not trusted
to the agent, to which p 
P
j (3tj)wh
j points is added. The
trust game looks like the screenshot in Fig. 2.
Experiment process
Each subject in the experiment played twelve negotiation
games, with each triad followed by a trust game. The or-
der of games was randomized, and each subject faced triads
of agents that differed in terms of strategy of emotion ex-
pression policy, but not both. Instructions were delivered to
the subjects over video, and they were all debriefed after the
end of the experiment. After each negotiation game, subjects
were asked to answer, in Likert 1-7 scales, four short ques-
tions regarding their experience with the agent they had just
played with. Subjects were paid $20 for their participation,
which lasted about 45 minutes. They were also told that the
person who would score the highest number of points would
be awarded an extra $100. We had N = 88 subjects, for a
total of 1,056 negotiation games and 352 trust games.
Hypotheses
Our experiments were designed to test two hypotheses. The
ﬁrst concerns the inﬂuence of emotion on perceptions of
trustworthiness, while the second relates to the effect of
emotion on negotiation outcomes. We formulate our main
hypothesis (H1) using the notion of action-consistency. We
call an emotion expression action-consistent with a strat-
egy if the emotion emphasizes the characteristics of the
agent that manifest in its actions. Positive emotion typi-
cally emphasizes kindness and goodwill, whereas negative
emotion is usually illustrative of selﬁshness and intransi-
gence. Hence, positive emotion is more action-consistent
with non-self-interested strategies, and negative emotion is
more action-consistent with self-interested strategies. In the
same spirit, positive emotion is more action-consistent with
ﬂexible than with inﬂexible strategies. Alternative notions of
consistency, which we do not discuss here, have been intro-
duced in the literature before (e.g., (Nass et al. 2005)).
H1. People’s perceptions of an agent’s trustworthiness
are inﬂuenced by the action-consistency between the
agent’s emotional expression and its strategy.
Agents whose expressions are consistent with their
strategies will be preferred as partners for the trust
game. Thus, when faced with a choice among self-
interested or inﬂexible agents, people will tend to pre-
fer angry ones; and when faced with a choice among
non-self-interested or ﬂexible agents, they will tend to
prefer smiling ones.
H2. Within the negotiation, we expect that:
(a) The expression of anger will result in higher con-
cession rates by humans (Van Kleef, De Dreu, and
Manstead 2004).
(b) Agents who smile will help foster more integrative
outcomes (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992). Recall that
integrative outcomes are those in which the sum
of the two players’ payoffs is high. These can be
achieved if the players realize there are mutually
beneﬁcial exchanges (like one silver coin for one
iron coin) that increase both their payoffs.
(c) Positive emotion will cause humans to also con-
cede more points. The theory of “emotion conta-
gion” (Hatﬁeld, Cacioppo, and Rapson 1992) pre-
dicts that humans in those situations will be more
cooperative.Results
To assess people’s behavior in the trust game, we used as a
metric their choice of partner in the trust game. As was men-
tioned before, a trust game always came after three negoti-
ation games, in which the agents differed in their emotion
expression policy but not in their strategy. Therefore people
were presented with a choice among three candidate emo-
tion display policies (keeping strategy ﬁxed). To investigate
whether smiling agents or angry agents were preferred, we
tested for  = smile   angry = 0 (in which x denotes
the fraction expression x was chosen), which would be the
case if smiling and angry agents were equally preferred. We
observe that, among selﬁsh agents,  =  0:25;p < 0:05,
denotingapreferencetowardangryagents.Amongconceder
agents, we similarly have  =  0:125, although this is
not statistically signiﬁcant. A similar trend was seen with
Nash agents ( =  0:153). On the other hand, among tit-
for-tat agents we observe preference toward smiling agents
( = +0:25;p < 0:05). Notice that angryagents are being
morepreferredoversmilingonesthemorethestrategyofthe
agent becomes inﬂexible or self-interested, conﬁrming hy-
pothesis H1 (results are summarized in Table 2). We found
no effect of emotion on the amount of resource trusted.
Inﬂexible Flexible
Non-self-interested  0:153 +0:25
Self-interested  :0:25  0:125
Table 2:  = smile  angry, where x denotes the fraction of
times emotional expression x was preferred, for the various strate-
gies in the trust game. Asterisk denotes that the mean is signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero.
To assess the inﬂuence of emotion expression on nego-
tiation outcomes, we used both behavioral and subjective
measures. Behavioral measures include variables relating to
the negotiation game, such as the players’ payoff at the end
of the game, drop-out rates (i.e., the percentage of games
with an agent in which humans dropped out, ending the
game without a deal and awarding zero payoff to both par-
ticipants), and measures indicating whether the games’ in-
tegrative potential was exploited. Subjective measures, on
the other hand, come from people’s questionnaire responses
after each negotiation game. Table 3 lists all the measures
used. We now turn to our hypotheses.
Surprisingly, we did not observe anger having any effect
of the average human concession rate (), thus disconﬁrm-
ing hypothesis H2(a). Figure 3 plots the average concession
rate across emotion expressions for all four strategies exam-
ined. As can be seen, the average concession rate of the peo-
ple was strongly inﬂuenced by the strategy of the agent, but
very little by its emotion expression. Similarly, we found no
support that the drop-out rate (d), or the integrative poten-
tial, as measured by  or , was inﬂuenced by the choice
of emotion across all strategies (thus H2(b) is also rejected).
Finally, our hypothesis that positive emotion will inﬂuence
Figure 3: Average concession rate () per emotion expression and
strategy in the negotiation game (error bars denote 95% conﬁdence
intervals).
concession rates according to the theory of “emotion con-
tagion,” according to H2(c), was also not supported by our
measurements.
It must be noted that action-consistency seems to also
play a role in people’s subjective reports. With respect to
“liking” (q1) people showed an aversion towards always-
angry agents for ﬂexible strategies, but not for inﬂexible
ones. With respect to how much people felt the agent cared
about them (q2), always-smile agents were preferred under
non-self-interested strategies. Also, with respect to people’s
expressed desire to play with an agent again in the future
(q4), we saw an aversion toward always-angry agents only
among agents playing the tit-for-tat strategy. All the above
results indicate that action-consistent expressions are pre-
ferred over others. Finally, looking at how much the agent
was perceived to be human-like (q3) we noticed no effects
of emotion.
Supplementary results
This section presents further ﬁndings of the experiment that
were not directly related to the hypotheses examined. We re-
port these for two reasons: (a) because they might be useful
Behavioral Measures
a : agent points at the end of the game
h : human points at the end of the game
 = a + h : sum of payoffs
 = ah : product of payoffs
 : average human concession rate between two rounds
d : average drop-out rate (%)
Subjective Measures (Likert 1-7)
q1 : how much did you like this agent?
q2 : how much did you feel this agent cared about you?
q3 : how human-like was the agent?
q4 : would you play with this agent again?
Table 3: Behavioral and subjective measures.Figure 4: Average human and agent points in the end of the game
per strategy (error bars denote 95% conﬁdence intervals).
Figure 5: Average human drop-out rate per strategy (error bars de-
note 95% conﬁdence intervals).
in comparing with other negotiation experiments in the lit-
erature, and (b) as evidence that the various strategies our
agents employed did make a difference in people’s behavior
(in other words, the strategy choice was not superﬂuous).
Hence Figure 4 displays the points in the possession of the
agent and the human at the end of the game. Here it can
be seen that the conceder and selﬁsh agents (self-interested)
fare better in terms of ﬁnal score than the non-self-interested
agents. Also, the Nash agent causes very equitable outcomes
to be obtained.
Figure 5 show the effect of the selﬁsh agents on humans
who choose to drop-out, hence punishing the agent at a cost
(they both receive zero points). As can be seen in the chart,
no player drops out against any other agent, but up to a quar-
ter of the participants do when their partner shows such in-
transigence and self-interestedness.
Finally, Figure 6 shows the average duration of the game
in rounds. It is clear that people agree to a deal sooner
with non-self-interested agents, but try harder against self-
interested ones. (Interestingly enough, we observed a small
but statistically signiﬁcant difference of emotion expression
on the game’s duration in the case of the selﬁsh agent. In that
subset of the data, it can be seen that smiling causes peo-
ple to play on average for two more rounds with the selﬁsh
agent, trying to forge a deal, before they accept its terms or
drop out. We believe that this is because smiling conveys an
interest—on the agent’s behalf—to be cooperative and work
Figure 6: Average duration of game in rounds per strategy (error
bars denote 95% conﬁdence intervals).
together with the human, which keeps her trying for longer
before conceding to the fact that the agent will not change
its mind.)
Summary & Discussion
Our experiment has illustrated that agents can use the ex-
pression of emotion to inﬂuence how trustworthy humans
perceive them to be. These human perceptions were re-
ﬂected by people’s choice of partner in a “trust game,” for
which they had to select one among three agents. These
agents had previously interacted with them in the context
of a negotiation and differed in their emotional expressions,
but not in their negotiation strategies. Second, we observed
that, given a set of very “scripted” and predictable nego-
tiation strategies, emotion seems to be ignored and well-
documented effects of it disappear. In interpreting this ﬁnd-
ing, we hypothesize that when the emotion does not carry
useful new information, it fails to inﬂuence human decision-
making in a strong and consistent manner.
These results imply that emotion expression can confer
advantages to an agent and can be seen as an essential part of
agent design, perhaps just as important as the strategy of the
agent, if the goal is to ensure “returning customers.” As our
experiment has indicated, agents with the appropriate emo-
tion expressions can be perceived as more trustworthy and
be selected more often for repeated interactions, even if the
algorithms used for their decision-making do not differ from
other agents’. Moreover, this effect of emotion is not neces-
sarily mediated by the outcome of the interaction between a
person and an agent. In other words, it is not necessarily the
fact that emotion expressions change the outcome of an in-
teraction, which then in turn inﬂuences human perceptions.
Even when the outcome of the negotiation in our experi-
ment remained the same across emotion expression condi-
tions, people’s perceptions of the agents’ trustworthiness in
practice differed signiﬁcantly.
Furthermore, our ﬁndings indicate that emotion is a sig-
nal people attend to in their decision-making by consider-
ing an contextual interpretation of it. Hence, it is not merely
the “presence” of some emotion (e.g., statically positive
emotion) that matters, but what this emotion is capable of
telling people about the situation. Therefore, in cases where
the emotion expressed is not easily or unambiguously at-tributable to some (real or imagined) trait or intention of the
agent, its presence might fail to introduce any effect. This
complicates the design of emotion expressions for artiﬁcial
agents, but also establishes a link between emotions and the
tasks and roles the agents are expected to perform.
Inthefutureweplantoextendtheseinvestigations.Inpar-
ticular, we wish to explore a wider set of negotiation strate-
gies, which will be more “natural” and differ along more
dimensions than just self-interestedness and ﬂexibility. We
also plan to entertain more varied emotional expressions, in
terms of the emotion types the agent is capable of display-
ing, as well as the appraisal functions used to compute what
emotion should be expressed in every circumstance. Finally,
we are interested in exploring how emotional signals im-
pact strategic reasoning, and whether game-theoretic models
of decision-making can be developed that receive affective
signals to update belief distributions and compute best re-
sponses given such non-verbal cues.
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